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PILOT ACCEPTANCE, COMPLIANCE, AND PERFORMANCE
WITH AN AIRBORNE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT TOOLSET
Nathan A. Doble Richard Barhydt Dr. Karthik Krishnamurthy
Titan Corporation NASA Langley Research Center Titan Corporation
Hampton, VA Hampton, VA Hampton, VA
A human-in-the-loop experiment was conducted at the NASA Ames and Langley Research Centers, investigating
the En Route Free Maneuvering component of a future air traffic management concept termed Distributed
Air/Ground Traffic Management (DAG-TM). NASA Langley test subject pilots used the Autonomous Operations
Planner (AOP) airborne toolset to detect and resolve traffic conflicts, interacting with subject pilots and air traffic
controllers at NASA Ames. Experimental results are presented, focusing on conflict resolution maneuver choices,
AOP resolution guidance acceptability, and performance metrics. Based on these results, suggestions are made to
further improve the AOP interface and functionality.
Introduction
In today’s air transportation business environment,
aircraft operators are increasingly looking for means
to increase flight efficiency. However, with air travel
demand once again rising to levels that exacerbate
delays and challenge the capacity of the National
Airspace System (FAA, 2004), large efficiency
improvements may be difficult to realize under
current operational conditions. As a result, it has been
acknowledged that a transformational, rather than
evolutionary, approach to air traffic management
modernization is needed (DOT, 2004).
As part of the Advanced Air Transportation
Technologies project, NASA has developed such a
far-term, transformational concept, called Distributed
Air/Ground Traffic Management (DAG-TM)
(NASA,  1999).  The  goals  of  DAG-TM  are  to
increase efficiency and maintain safety through a
redistribution of decision-making authority among
airborne and ground-based elements of the air
transportation system. It is a gate-to-gate concept,
addressing all flight phases from dispatch to arrival.
En Route Free Maneuvering
En Route Free Maneuvering is one component of
DAG-TM, addressing the en route and terminal-
transition phases of flight. In an En Route Free
Maneuvering environment, trained crews of equipped
aircraft assume responsibility for traffic separation.
Such crews would be free to modify their flight path
in real time, without approval from an air traffic
controller, as long as basic flow management
initiatives are complied with (e.g., crossing a terminal
airspace entry point at a specified time). These flights
would operate under a new set of flight rules called
Autonomous Flight Rules (AFR).
Except for busy terminal areas, where AFR
operations would not be permitted, AFR traffic
would be integrated with Instrument Flight Rules
(IFR) traffic. AFR flight crews would be responsible
for separation from both IFR and other AFR aircraft.
Air traffic controllers would issue flow management
constraints to all aircraft, and continue to provide
separation among IFR aircraft, accommodating those
operators who choose not to equip for AFR. By
distributing separation assurance among multiple
airborne and ground-based elements in this way, the
National  Airspace  System  may  be  able  to  absorb  a
higher increase in demand beyond what is possible
with a centralized, ground-based approach.
Background
Previous Research
The work presented in this paper builds upon previous
studies conducted at NASA as well as initial Free Flight
research by organizations such as NLR in the
Netherlands (Hoekstra et al., 2000). Past NASA
experiments investigated such topics as AFR operations
in confined airspace and the use of aircraft intent for
decision making (Krishnamurthy et al., 2003).
The Autonomous Operations Planner
Central to AFR operations are the capabilities of
airborne conflict prevention, detection, and
resolution, as well as adherence to traffic flow
management constraints. It is assumed that pilots
cannot safely perform these functions without some
form of decision support. As such, NASA Langley
Research Center has developed a prototype airborne
toolset called the Autonomous Operations Planner
(AOP) (Barhydt & Krishnamurthy, 2004).
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The prototype AOP interface is designed around a
modern “glass cockpit” flight deck. It provides
conflict alerts and resolution guidance via the
navigation display, using state and intent data from
the  ownship  and  proximate  traffic.  To  meet  flow
constraints, it also generates conflict-free paths that
achieve Required Times of Arrival (RTAs) at
waypoints. The AOP has been developed using a
human-centered approach, with resolution guidance
complementing the pilot’s choice of control mode.
For  example,  when  the  aircraft  is  being  flown  in  a
tactical mode (e.g., a selected heading or altitude) or
when very near-term conflicts exist, resolution
guidance is presented as a simple heading or vertical
speed  command.  When  the  aircraft  is  flown  in  a
strategic mode (i.e., coupled to the aircraft’s flight
management system (FMS)), resolution guidance is
presented as an FMS route modification.
Conflicts are displayed by highlighting the intruder
aircraft and indicating the region of conflict along the
active flight path with a colored “dog bone.” The
AOP also provides information to help pilots avoid
inadvertently creating new conflicts while
maneuvering. These conflict prevention tools take on
two forms: Maneuver Restriction Bands and
Provisional Conflict Alerts. Maneuver Restriction
Bands are displayed as “no fly” heading and vertical
speed ranges. Using a “dashed dog bone” symbology,
Provisional Conflict Alerts show regions of conflict
along proposed flight paths (e.g., a modified but
unexecuted FMS route or a selected but unengaged
heading).  Figure  1  shows  an  example  of  AOP
symbology on a Boeing 777-style navigation display.
Area of Conflict
Along Current
FMS Route
(“dog bone”)
Conflict
Aircraft
Resolution Maneuver
Uploaded to FMS as
Mod Route
Maneuver
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Figure 1. AOP Interface with Strategic Resolution
Experimental Approach
In summer 2004, the NASA Ames and Langley
Research Centers jointly conducted a human-in-the-
loop simulation of En Route Free Maneuvering
operations (Barhydt & Kopardekar, 2005). This
experiment extended the previous research in several
ways.  A  realistic,  mixed  AFR-IFR  operating
environment was simulated, including overflight
aircraft as well as arrivals. The AOP was enhanced to
provide vertical resolution guidance in addition to
lateral guidance. In addition, interactions with
ground-based air traffic controllers were studied.
This  paper  presents  a  subset  of  the  En  Route  Free
Maneuvering experimental results, focusing on
conflict resolution maneuver choices, pilot-reported
acceptability of AOP guidance, and performance
metrics, including how pilot compliance with AOP
affected resolution performance.
Participants
Test subjects included 12 pilots at NASA Langley as
well as pilots and air traffic controllers at NASA
Ames. The NASA Langley subject pilots were all
Airline Transport Pilot rated with experience in
Boeing glass cockpit aircraft. These pilots flew
workstation-based flight simulators that emulated the
displays of an AOP-equipped Boeing 777. Additional
AFR and IFR background traffic was supplied with
pseudo-pilot stations staffed by research personnel.
Figure 2 shows the experimental airspace. It
consisted of simulated high- and low-altitude sectors
of a portion of Fort Worth Center. The sectors were
staffed at NASA Ames by five FAA-qualified air
traffic controllers. They provided separation services
between IFR aircraft and were given automated tools
for conflict detection and resolution. In addition,
researchers acted as pseudo-controllers in large
“ghost” sectors surrounding the experimental sectors,
providing limited services to flights entering and
exiting the subject-controlled airspace.
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Ghost Southeast
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High
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Wichita Falls
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Bowie
Low
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DFW
TRACON
BAMBE
HOWDY
AFR & IFR Arrivals
AFR Arrivals Only
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Figure 2. Experimental Airspace
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Scenario Design
The experiment was designed in a within-subjects
format, with 16 different scenarios. Four different
traffic conditions were simulated, which varied the
amount of traffic as well as the relative proportions of
AFR and IFR overflight aircraft. Table 1 details the
four traffic conditions.
Table 1. Traffic Conditions Tested
Condition Avg. Traffic Density % IFR % AFR
C1 slightly above currentMonitor Alert parameter 100% 0%
C2 equal to C1 density 75% 25%
C3 1.5 × C1 density 50% 50%
C4 2 × C1 density 35% 65%
At each of the four traffic conditions, pilots flew two
overflight profiles and two arrival profiles. Except for
C1 scenarios (in which all flights were IFR), subject
pilots were responsible for resolving scripted and
unscripted traffic conflicts. AOP alerted pilots to
conflicts up to 10 minutes prior to predicted Loss of
Separation  (LOS).  Pilots  were  trained  to  use  AOP
strategic resolution guidance, tactical resolution
guidance, and (in the case of manual maneuvers)
conflict prevention information as appropriate to the
situation. They were also instructed to operate the
aircraft as they would during line operations.
Although hand-flying was not available, pilots were
allowed to use any desired autopilot modes, including
both FMS-coupled modes and tactical modes.
Results & Discussion
The NASA Langley subject pilots encountered a total
of 500 traffic conflicts throughout the 12 AFR
scenarios (C2, C3, and C4). For 332 of these
conflicts, the subject pilot performed a resolution
maneuver. The analyses presented below show
results for these conflicts, without distinguishing
between traffic conditions. The effects of traffic
density on resolution performance are treated in a
separate publication (Doble, Barhydt, & Hitt, 2005).
AOP Compliance
To examine the effects of AOP resolution maneuver
compliance on resolution performance, resolution
maneuvers were divided into six categories, based
upon whether the maneuver was strategic or tactical
and whether or not the pilot followed AOP guidance.
These categories are summarized in Table 2. Two
different performance metrics were then used to
evaluate the maneuvers: induced conflicts and
conflicts requiring multiple resolution maneuvers.
Table 2. Resolution Compliance Categories
Category Description Count
Strategic
Comply
Pilot implements AOP-recommended route
modification without modifications 141
Strategic
Noncomply
Pilot edits waypoints before implementing
AOP-recommended route modification 0
Strategic
Manual
Pilot ignores or does not seek AOP
resolution, and manually edits waypoints,
altitudes, etc. of FMS active route
15
Tactical
Comply
Pilot maneuvers in direction of AOP-
recommended heading or vertical speed 118
Tactical
Noncomply
Pilot maneuvers away from AOP-
recommended heading or vertical speed 15
Tactical
Manual
AOP tactical guidance not available, pilot
implements own lateral or vertical
maneuver via autopilot mode control panel
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Induced Conflicts. The frequency of induced conflicts
is a measure of the ability of pilots and AOP to
account  for  aircraft  other  than  the  intruder  when
calculating a resolution maneuver. An induced
conflict was defined as a new conflict arising within
one minute of a previous resolution maneuver and
directly caused by that maneuver. Figure 3 shows the
percentage of resolutions inducing a conflict in each
of the six compliance categories. Results from 2 tests
indicate no significant differences in the frequency of
induced conflicts across the three tactical categories
2(2, N = 176) = 0.27, p > 0.05), but a significantly
higher frequency of induced conflicts for Strategic
Manual maneuvers vs. Strategic Comply maneuvers
2(1, N = 156) = 32.2, p < 0.05).
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Figure 3. Induced Conflicts vs. AOP Compliance
The lowest induced conflict rates occurred when pilots
followed AOP guidance. This highlights the advantage
of decision support when resolving conflicts involving
multiple proximate aircraft. It is conjectured that the
relatively high rate of induced conflicts among tactical
maneuvers was due primarily to two factors: the time
to predicted LOS when the maneuvers were executed,
and the characteristics of the AOP tactical resolution
algorithm. During the experiment, tactical resolution
maneuvers were generally initiated closer to predicted
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LOS than strategic maneuvers. In such situations,
especially in the high-density airspace simulated in this
experiment, some induced conflicts may be inherently
unavoidable, as the first priority is usually to resolve
the most critical conflict in a timely manner. In
addition, for very near-term conflicts (under 2 minutes
to LOS), the AOP tactical resolution algorithm did not
take other aircraft into account when calculating
resolution guidance. This algorithm was chosen for its
ability to successfully resolve complicated conflict
situations without the need for maneuver coordination
between aircraft (Eby, 1994). Ongoing research will
investigate the integration of this algorithm with the
AOP conflict prevention tools in order to further
reduce induced conflicts.
While the significant increase in induced conflicts for
Strategic Manual resolutions is cause for concern, it
should be noted that three of these five induced
conflicts were caused by the same pilot during the
same scenario. Nevertheless, pilot training and the
AOP conflict prevention symbology may warrant
further attention as these subject pilots all
implemented route modifications despite being
shown Provisional Conflict Alerts.
Multiple Resolutions. The frequency of multiple
resolutions is a measure of the ability of pilots and
AOP to resolve a conflict and remain out of conflict.
If a subject pilot was in conflict with the same
intruder multiple times and implemented more than
one resolution maneuver, this was noted as a multiple
resolution conflict. Figure 4 shows the percentage of
conflicts requiring multiple resolutions in each
compliance category. Results from 2 tests indicate
no significant differences in the frequency of multiple
resolutions across the strategic categories ( 2(1, N =
156) = 1.67, p > 0.05). The differences among
tactical categories were significant ( 2(2, N = 176) =
6.04, p < 0.05).
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Figure 4. Multiple Resolutions vs. AOP Compliance
The lower multiple resolution rate for maneuvers that
complied with AOP guidance (vs. manual
maneuvers) shows the benefits of decision support
when resolving conflicts between aircraft flying
complex, four-dimensional trajectories. While the
lowest multiple resolution rate occurred when pilots
did not follow AOP guidance (Tactical Noncomply),
this is not seen as a cause for concern. Compliance
only accounted for 3% of the variance in multiple
resolutions, and this category of maneuvers had a
relatively small sample size. In addition, there may
have been a performance tradeoff, with these
maneuvers effectively avoiding the intruder aircraft
at the expense of additional induced conflicts.
Choice of Maneuver Axis
To judge the relative effectiveness of lateral and
vertical AOP guidance, the maneuvers categorized
above as Strategic Comply and Tactical Comply were
further separated into Strategic Lateral, Strategic
Vertical, Tactical Lateral, and Tactical Vertical
categories.
Induced Conflicts. Figure 5 shows the percentage of
induced conflicts that occurred for each of the four
axis categories. Results from 2 tests indicate no
significant differences between either the strategic
categories ( 2(1, N = 141) = 0.46, p >  0.05)  or  the
tactical categories ( 2(1, N = 118) = 0.37, p > 0.05).
For the reasons mentioned above, it is not surprising
that strategic resolutions resulted in fewer induced
conflicts than tactical resolutions, but within the
strategic and tactical categories, the choice of
maneuver axis appears to have had little effect.
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Figure 5. Induced Conflicts vs. Maneuver Axis
(When AOP Complied With)
Multiple Resolutions. Figure 6 shows the percentage
of  multiple  resolutions  that  occurred  for  each  of  the
four maneuver axis categories. Results from 2 tests
indicate no significant differences between either the
two strategic categories ( 2(1, N = 141) = 1.24, p >
0.05) or the two tactical categories ( 2(1, N = 118) =
0.02, p > 0.05). This shows that lateral and vertical
maneuvers were similarly effective in preventing
multiple resolutions. However, the slightly higher
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incidence of multiple resolutions for Strategic
Vertical maneuvers is worth noting. These maneuvers
required pilots to adjust the autopilot altitude value in
addition to uploading an FMS route modification.
There were cases when the altitude value was not
properly adjusted and the aircraft failed to follow the
resolution maneuver. Compounding this was the
difficulty of displaying vertical path changes on a
horizontal situation display. Ongoing research will
investigate other options for presenting vertical
maneuver information, including the use of vertical
situation displays.
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Figure 6. Multiple Resolutions vs. Maneuver Axis
(When AOP Complied With)
Acceptability of AOP Resolution Guidance
To examine factors that affect pilot perception of the
acceptability of AOP resolution guidance, subject
pilots were asked after each scenario to rate, on a 1 to
7 scale, the acceptability of a) the first AOP strategic
resolution in the scenario, and b) AOP tactical
resolutions in general during the scenario. A series of
correlations was then performed to determine if
relationships existed between resolution acceptability
and four other factors: conflict duration, maneuver
axis (lateral or vertical), multiple resolutions, and
induced conflicts. These results are presented in
Table 3. Overall resolution acceptability was high for
both strategic resolutions (M = 6.31, SD = 1.28) and
tactical resolutions (M = 5.12, SD = 1.60).
Table 3. Resolution Acceptability
Acceptability Correlation
Attribute Strategic
Resolutions
(N = 109)
Tactical
Resolutions
(N = 135)
Test
Conflict
Duration -0.24* 0.02 Pearson
Maneuver
Axis -0.18 0.10
Point-
biserial
Multiple
Resolution -0.39* 0.14
Point-
biserial
Induced
Conflict -0.02 -0.17*
Point-
biserial
* = significant correlation at p < 0.05 level
The acceptability of AOP strategic resolution
maneuvers was significantly correlated with conflict
duration and multiple resolutions. The significance of
conflict duration agrees with comments provided
during debrief sessions, which indicated that pilots
were frustrated by AOP computation delays and the
options available when AOP was unable to calculate
a solution. While the AOP strategic resolution
algorithm (a genetic algorithm) normally converged
on a solution within one second, insufficient
feedback may have been provided to pilots when
computation times were longer, creating the
appearance that AOP had “frozen up.” The
significant correlation with multiple resolutions is
also reasonable, as one of the primary benefits of
intent-based, strategic decision support is that the
necessity for multiple resolution maneuvers should
be reduced by accounting for trajectory changes that
would be unknown to a solely state-based system.
The acceptability of AOP tactical resolutions was
only significantly correlated with whether or not the
resolution induced a conflict. As mentioned above,
depending on the time to predicted LOS, the AOP
tactical guidance may or may not have accounted for
aircraft  other  than  the  intruder.  As  such,  there  were
cases when the tactical guidance disagreed with
Maneuver Restriction Bands. Although this behavior
was explained to subject pilots during training
exercises, this is recognized as a significant human
factors issue. Research is underway to modify the
AOP near-term tactical resolution logic so that
conflicting information is not presented to pilots.
Practice Effects
The En Route Free Maneuvering experiment lasted a
total of eight days, with three days devoted to
training, four days for data collection, and one day
for debriefing. Each data collection day included four
scenarios, with one at each traffic condition, and with
the order of conditions varying across days.
To identify any learning or practice effects, conflicts
were  sorted  by  day  and  evaluated  with  the  same
performance metrics presented above. Figure 7 shows
the frequency of induced conflicts and multiple
resolutions across days. 2 tests indicate that no
significant differences in the frequency of induced
conflicts ( 2(3, N = 332) = 1.37, p >  0.05)  or  in  the
frequency of multiple resolutions ( 2(3, N = 332) =
4.78, p > 0.05) existed across the four days.
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Figure 7.  Resolution Performance by Day
While no significant practice effects were found, it is
interesting to compare the performance by day with
the resolution maneuvers chosen. Figure 8 shows the
percentage of maneuver types chosen each day.
Notionally, resolution performance appears to
degrade with increases in manual and non-complying
maneuvers over the first three days of the experiment,
then improve on Day 4 with an increase in Strategic
Comply maneuvers.
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Figure 8. Resolution Maneuver Compliance by Day
Conclusions
Through the above analysis of conflict resolution
maneuvers, several conclusions can be drawn about
the performance of pilots during AOP-equipped AFR
operations. First, the choice of maneuver axis (lateral
or vertical) had little effect on resolution
performance, indicating that resolution maneuvers
can be well-executed in either axis. Second,
resolution performance was shown to generally
improve when pilots complied with AOP-
recommended resolution maneuvers. Finally,
although pilot acceptability of AOP guidance was
high overall, possible ways to further increase
acceptability and performance were identified. These
methods include better integration of AOP near-term
tactical resolution logic with conflict prevention
information, improved feedback when AOP cannot
converge on a strategic solution, and the potential
inclusion of a vertical situation display. Along with
previous findings, these results further support the
feasibility of the En Route Free Maneuvering concept
while highlighting areas for future research.
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SAFETY ATTITUDES IN THE AVIATION SYSTEM: INFLUENCES OF A HIGHLY REGULATED
ENVIRONMENT
Teresa C. D’Oliveira
Instituto Superior de Psicologia Aplicada
Lisbon, Portugal
Although safety is considered paramount in the aviation industry, very few studies have explored the influence that
such a highly regulated environment may have on safety attitudes. This paper explores how perceptions and attitudes
may be influenced by context characteristics and analyses how a highly regulated context, such as the aviation
industry, compares with other industries. Results suggest that the aviation industry seems to be centered on
individual behaviors and attitudes towards safety; in contrast other industries highlight safety at the organizational
level. Implications of these results and repercussions of national safety campaigns to promote safety at the
workplace are considered.
Introduction
Workplace safety and, in particular, the analysis of
occupational accidents have emphasized the
importance and interrelationship of two main
contributors: The technical component which
involves physical working conditions, machinery,
equipment and work instruments and the Human
component comprising job incumbents, teams,
supervisors and top managers (e.g., Oliver, Cheyne,
Tomás & Cox, 2002; Sarkus, 2001). The
development of a positive safety culture and
constructive attitudes towards safety are considered
as an important and effective strategy to promote and
maintain a safe workplace. In many instances,
attitude surveying is recommended as a quick and
helpful way of conducting a safety diagnostic.
The literature on safety attitudes presents a variety of
dimensions and a plethora of instruments (e.g., Cox
and Cox, 1991; Díaz & Cabrera, 1997; Glendon,
Staton & Harrison, 1994; Zohar, 1980). A renaming
and grouping exercise on the existent measures is
considered necessary (Guldenmund, 2000; Sorensen,
2002) with possible identification of core dimensions
and clear explanations on the issue of dimensionality.
These efforts led to the development of a measure to
evaluate attitudes towards safety that can be used in
various contexts (D’Oliveira, 2004). A methodology
similar to the one adopted by Williamson, Feyer,
Cairns and Biancotti (1997) was used and a measure
considering eight scales was put together. Safety
areas considered were: Organizational objectives,
organizational practices and safety, information on
safety issues, management and supervisors’ attitudes,
personal attitudes to safety, risk perceptions and
relationships with co-workers.
Safety is paramount in the aviation system and efforts
have considered both the technical component (e.g., by
fostering safer machinery) and human interventions
(e.g., through improved training like CRM). The
industry investments in standards and practices led to
an outstanding safety record (ICAO, 2004).
Context characteristics such as the activities
performed, the hazards involved and the degree of
regulation imposed by the industry may play an
important role when discussing safety attitudes and
safety culture. These characteristics have yet to be
considered in the literature on safety culture/climate.
Very few studies have considered safety attitudes in
different industries (e.g., Diaz & Cabrera, 1997). This
paper addresses these issues and explores how
perceptions and attitudes may be influenced by
context characteristics and analyses how a highly
regulated context, such as the aviation industry,
compares with other industries.
Method
Participants
A total of 346 participants, 60.4% men and 396
females, from various industries (aviation, health, car
industry, metal industry, etc.) were invited to
participate in this study. Table 1 presents sample’s
main characteristics.
Table 1. Participants’ main characteristics
Age M = 36.71, SD=10.09
Qualifications M = 9.9 years
Contract Full time permanent = 84.3 %
Position Supervisor = 19.1%
Industry Aviation = 25.4%;
Non Aviation = 74.6%
Pilots, Cabin crew, Maintenance
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Instrument
A measure was developed using a methodology
similar to the one adopted by Williamson, Feyer,
Cairns and Biancotti (1997) was used in this study.
Specifically, a review of the literature was conducted
in order to identify potential measures of attitudes
towards workplace safety. All potential measures
were then considered as a full set and items were
assembled according to their content. This procedure
led to the identification of seven dimensions:
organizational objectives, organizational practices
and safety, information on safety issues, management
and supervisors’ attitudes, you and safety issues,
personal appreciation of risk and relationships with
coworkers. A detailed definition of each dimension
(Table 2) was then produced and eight items were
selected to represent each safety attitude dimension.
The final measure was composed of 56 items, each
item being responded in a 5 point rating scale.
Table 2. Safety attitude dimensions (Cronbach’s
values for each dimension).
Sub-Scale Definition
A – Organizational Objectives
This dimension considers how the Organization
values safety issues. The potential conflict
between safety and productivity, the Organization
openness to discuss issues related to safety and
proposals  by  the  employees  are  some  of  the
issues considered in the literature (  = .725).
B- Organizational Practices & Safety
This dimension addresses how organizational
practices such as training, performance
evaluation, promotion, accident/incident
investigation may be related with safety (  =
.850).
C - Information on Safety Issues
This dimension tries to evaluate how the
Organization stimulates the diffusion of
information related with safety by creating safety
awards, safety bonus, how workers might present
suggestions or report their safety concerns, etc (
= .720).
D- Management & Supervisors Attitudes
In this dimension, supervisors and top managers’
behavior is considered by assessing workers
perceptions of their technical knowledge on
safety issues, proactive or reactive safety attitude
and their support to workers safety concerns (  =
.806).
E – Yourself & Safety
This dimension considers the knowledge and
satisfaction of workers in relation to safety and
their awareness of the consequences of their
behavior to safety in general (  = .776).
F – Risk Perceptions
In this dimension workers’ perceptions of the
risks involved in their activities are considered
along with their estimative of how probable it is
to be involved in an accident (  = .717).
G – Relationships with coworkers
This dimension considers workers perceptions of
their colleagues’ knowledge and behaviors
related to safety. It also includes the perception of
being part of a group and how this characteristic
influences personal behavior (  = .808).
Procedure
A general instruction was given to every participant as
to how they should fill in the questionnaire: volunteers
should give a description of their own company
regarding safety issues. The objective of the study was
to gather information that could help companies to
improve their safety policies and results.
Results
A total of seven MANOVAS were conduct in order
to explore potential differences between aviation and
non aviation participants. Table 3 summarizes main
results obtained in these analyses.
Table 3. Differences between aviation and non-
aviation participants in each subscale
Sub-Scale Results
Organizational
Objectives
Pillai’s Trace= .163, F= 7,990;
p<.000
Non aviation has higher means
Organizational
Practices &
Safety
Pillai’s Trace= .108, F= 4,958;
p<.000
Information on
Safety Issues
Pillai’s Trace= .135, F= 6,374;
p<.000
Non aviation has higher means
(ns differences)
Management
& Supervisors
Attitudes
Pillai’s Trace= .141, F= 6,859;
p<.000
Yourself &
Safety
Pillai’s Trace= .266, F=
15,149; p<.000
Aviation has higher means
Risk
Perceptions
Pillai’s Trace= .105, F= 4,751;
p<.000
Non aviation has higher means
Relationships
with
coworkers
Pillai’s Trace= .189, F=9,675;
p<.000
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Discussion
Results obtained suggest differences between
aviation and non-aviation participants in every
dimension. In what concerns organizational
objectives, information on safety issues and risk
perceptions, non-aviation systematically has higher
means.
Non-aviation participants compose a positive
depiction of their companies: safety goals are clearly
stated, safety procedures work well and are followed,
there seems to be more information available on
safety issues but it is recognized that sometimes there
is a conflict between productivity and safety,
something mentioned in the literature.
In what concerns aviation participants, they seem to
have a personal relation with safety issues that
appears to be more positive (receive safety
information, understand safety rules, know training
needed) and there is a proactive attitude towards
safety (recognize that their personal intervention may
avoid potential hazards), and attitudes and behaviors
associated with an appreciation of risks involved in
their jobs.
Organizational practices and procedures towards
safety, management and supervisor’s behaviors and
attitudes and relationship with colleagues although
presenting mixed results provide support to the
differences previously identified. In the aviation
context, safety is part of performance appraisal,
supervisors are aware of what safety training each
worker has, and participants report reliable safety
behaviors in their colleagues. Non-aviation
participants report that their work procedures are
accurate and a reflection of what they actually do in
their jobs, characteristics probably associated with a
lesser degree of complexity in their jobs.
All  in  all,  results  suggest  the  presence  of  two
different safety systems. Aviation safety systems
seem to have at their centre individual safety
qualifications: a greater risk in the activities
performed is associated with the requirements for
specific and formal safety training. Such
qualifications are quite relevant in this context; not
only are they included in the performance appraisal
but also management and supervisors are aware of
each worker qualifications. In the aviation context, if
you do not have the necessary safety training, you
will not be able to work.
In contrast, non-aviation industries seem to centre on
the  company  safety  records  as  a  whole:  company
goals are emphasized, general information on safety
is available, supervisors encourage involvement in
safety issues and are perceived to know safety
inspections’ results. This analysis is further supported
by non-aviation better results in “we are recognized
and rewarded for working together”.
In  this  sense  it  would  be  appropriate  to  say  that
aviation safety systems are individualistic by nature
and non-aviation safety systems are much more
collectivistic. Such perspectives can also be
associated with an “organizational locus of control or
accountability”.
Results from non-aviation organizations may be
related with recent government investments in
workplace safety. Portugal has one of the worst work
accident rates in the European Community. Support
for safety training, safety programs, safety prizes,
safety inspections and media campaigns have been
created to address this problem. The problem is
depicted as a national problem (national statistics
may involve anyone) or an organizational problem
(fines for companies that do not follow safety
recommendations) and an issue that needs every
person’s contribution. Such perspective helps to
depart from an individualistic approach of work
accidents or the bad apple theory (Dekker, 2002) that
hinders organizational safety learning. Advantages of
this viewpoint should be considered by aviation
safety systems as it may complement the existing
perspective.
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